Geran 5: Russia’s New Jet-Powered Drone Explained

The Geran-5 is a new Russian one-way attack drone powered by a turbojet engine. It is substantially larger and faster than the well-known propeller-driven Geran-2. According to Ukrainian intelligence, a Chinese turbojet accelerates it to between 450 and 600 km/h, while its warhead weighs 90 kilograms. Technically, this brings the system closer to a simple cruise missile, although that does not automatically make it one.

This analysis explains what is reliably known about the Geran-5, why published dimensions have changed and how the drone affects the cost equation of Ukrainian air defence. The main sources are the detailed component profile published by Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (DIU), specialist assessments and recent statements about Russian production. In wartime, neither Russian claims nor Ukrainian intelligence findings can be independently verified in every detail.

Featured-image notice: Bild mit KI generiert. AI-generated editorial concept image; not a photograph of an actual operation.

What is the Geran-5?

The Geran-5 is a Russian jet-powered long-range attack drone that strikes its target with a permanently installed warhead and is destroyed in the process. Ukrainian Defence Intelligence reported its first use during combined air attacks in early January 2026. On 19 January, the DIU’s War & Sanctions portal published a detailed technical profile including a 3D model, components and performance figures.

Unlike the delta-wing Geran-2, the Geran-5 has a long tubular fuselage, centrally mounted wings and a conventional tail. Its basic shape resembles a small unmanned jet aircraft or a simple cruise missile more than the familiar Shahed drones. DIU also sees structural similarities to Iran’s Karrar. However, a clear and independently documented development lineage has not yet been made public.

Geran-5 specifications

Feature	Reported figure	Assessment
Length	6.5 metres	DIU detailed profile dated 19 January 2026
Wingspan	3.2 metres	DIU detailed profile; early reports cited 5.5 metres
Maximum take-off weight	850 kilograms	Reported maximum
Warhead	90 kilograms	Exact explosive configuration remains unclear
Cruising speed	450–600 km/h	Roughly two to three times faster than many propeller-driven attack drones
Endurance	Up to 2 hours	Depends on flight profile and payload
Range	Up to 950 kilometres	DIU estimate, not an independently measured production figure
Maximum altitude	Up to 6,000 metres	DIU says observed operations generally occurred between 200 and 3,000 metres
Engine	Telefly TF-TJ2000A	Chinese turbojet with a reported thrust of 200 kgf, or about 1,960 newtons
Manufacturer attribution	Alabuga Special Economic Zone	Attribution by Ukrainian intelligence

The conflicting dimensions are not a typographical error. Initial DIU statements described a drone approximately six metres long with a 5.5-metre wingspan. The later and more detailed component profile gives a length of 6.5 metres and a wingspan of 3.2 metres. In the absence of public production documents, the newer detailed profile is the stronger working reference, but the discrepancy still needs to be disclosed.

The jet engine is the decisive difference

The Telefly TF-TJ2000A is a Chinese turbojet. According to the DIU profile, it produces around 200 kilograms-force of thrust, considerably more than the smaller engine used by the Geran-3. A separate launch motor apparently assists take-off before the main engine takes over.

Operationally, top speed alone does not tell the whole story. At 500 km/h, the drone covers about 8.3 kilometres per minute. If it is reliably detected and classified only 30 kilometres from a protected target, defenders have less than four minutes to build a track, make a decision and engage it. Course changes, terrain masking and simultaneous incoming targets can shorten this window further.

The turbojet also creates disadvantages. It consumes more fuel than a piston engine, produces stronger heat and acoustic signatures and increases technical complexity. The Geran-5 is therefore unlikely to replace slower systems completely. A mixed attack is more plausible: cheap decoys and propeller drones occupy sensors while faster jet-powered weapons compress the remaining response time.

Navigation, data links and possible remote control

According to DIU, the examined drone used several systems already familiar from the Geran family:

• an FCU flight-control unit;
• a SADRA/MINSOO-family inertial navigation system;
• the interference-resistant Kometa-M12 satellite-navigation system with a twelve-element antenna;
• a Tracker V3 telemetry system based on a Raspberry Pi microcomputer and 3G/LTE modems; and
• a Chinese XK-F358 mesh-network modem.

This equipment potentially offers more than a fixed flight along pre-programmed coordinates. Mobile and mesh links can transmit telemetry, update waypoints or exchange information between platforms. It does not prove that every Geran-5 is remotely controlled in real time throughout its mission. Network coverage, jamming, antenna geometry and the selected mission profile all limit those functions.

Kometa-M12 is intended to make satellite navigation more resistant to interference. Its CRPA antenna can suppress jamming sources by direction. Electronic warfare therefore remains relevant, but it is not a guaranteed stand-alone solution. Modern counter-UAS systems combine detection, electronic effects and kinetic interception.

Drone or cruise missile?

The technical boundary is blurred. Both categories can be unmanned, jet-powered, long-ranged and fitted with a permanently installed warhead. “Drone” initially describes an unmanned aircraft; “cruise missile” describes a guided weapon that carries its warhead to the target and does not return.

Functionally, the Geran-5 displays many characteristics of a basic cruise missile. Its modular electronics, its place in the Geran product family and the possible use of communications links help explain why Ukrainian authorities and media continue to classify it as a UAV. In military terms, the label matters less than its speed, signature, flight profile, numbers and the cost of each interception.

Geran-2, Geran-3 and Geran-5 compared

System	Airframe and propulsion	Operational role
Geran-2	Delta wing, piston engine and pusher propeller	Slow, comparatively inexpensive long-range attack drone suitable for large waves
Geran-3	Shahed-like delta wing with a small turbojet	Faster development that largely retains the familiar airframe
Geran-5	Tubular fuselage, conventional wings and a more powerful turbojet	Heavier and faster platform with a 90-kilogram warhead and a reported 950-kilometre range

Recent Ukrainian statements identify the Geran-4 and Geran-5 together as priorities in a Russian production shift. Their designations do not represent a simple, uninterrupted sequence of generations. Different airframes, engines and mission profiles can be produced in parallel. Describing the Geran-5 only as a faster Geran-2 therefore understates the extent of the redesign.

Why the Geran-5 challenges air defence

Against slower Shahed and Geran variants, Ukraine uses a layered network of acoustic sensors, mobile fire groups, automatic cannon, electronic warfare, interceptor drones and surface-to-air missiles. This division of labour is intended to reserve expensive guided missiles for targets that cannot be defeated more cheaply.

At 450 to 600 km/h, the Geran-5 can outrun some low-cost interceptor drones. In July 2026, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat said jet drones flying at around 500 km/h could no longer be caught by interceptors limited to roughly 300 km/h. This does not apply to every Ukrainian interceptor, but it illustrates the speed gap.

A credible response requires layered defence:

1. Earlier detection: networked radar, radio-frequency and passive sensors extend the response window.
2. Faster interceptor drones: new platforms require sufficient speed advantage and range.
3. Gun-based short-range defence: systems such as the Gepard anti-aircraft tank can engage suitable flight profiles but need timely targeting data.
4. Short-range air-defence missiles: they close gaps, although they are usually more expensive than simple interceptor drones.
5. Passive protection: dispersion, camouflage, hardening and rapid repair reduce the effect of weapons that penetrate the defensive screen.

The fundamental problem is economic. A tactically successful defence may still be strategically unsustainable if every interception consistently costs several times more than the attacking weapon. The Geran-5 therefore targets not only physical infrastructure, but also the defender’s time, attention and ammunition stocks.

Production: what the latest figures actually mean

On 10 August 2026, DIU deputy chief Vadym Skibitskyi said Russia was retooling parts of its production for the turbojet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5. He cited a Russian August planning figure of 11,000 attack drones across several types. Jet-powered drones had reportedly accounted for about half of the unmanned systems used in one recent attack.

This must not be read as confirmed monthly production of 11,000 Geran-5 drones. The cited total includes several Geran, Garpiya and Gerbera variants, including decoys and seeker-equipped versions. It is also a Ukrainian intelligence assessment of Russian planning, not audited delivery data. The statement nevertheless matters because it indicates an industrial priority: Russia appears to be using speed to put Ukraine’s increasingly effective low-cost interception methods under pressure.

Foreign components and sanctions evasion

DIU identified electronics and assemblies from China, the United States and Germany in the examined system. The list includes the Chinese turbojet, semiconductors and clock generators associated with US manufacturers, and an Infineon transistor. One component reportedly carried a 2025 production code.

The presence of a branded component does not prove that its manufacturer knowingly supplied a Russian weapon programme. Many electronic parts are civilian mass-market goods and reach sanctioned supply chains through brokers, re-exports, third countries or falsely declared end users. The component profile therefore demonstrates the difficulty of modern export control: not only complete engines, but also inconspicuous standard parts can be critical to series production.

Air launch from a Su-25: operational or only proposed?

DIU reported that Russia was examining an air-launched Geran-5 carried by a Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. Such a launch could eliminate the ground booster, extend range and make launch locations less predictable. Publicly available evidence has not yet confirmed routine operational Geran-5 launches from Su-25 aircraft.

Occasional references to air-to-air missiles also do not establish a standard armed Geran-5 variant. Russia has experimented with such payloads on other Geran modifications. For the Geran-5 described here, the 90-kilogram strike warhead remains the best-documented main configuration.

What the Geran-5 means for Germany and NATO

The Geran-5 is not merely another individual target. It illustrates the growing category between inexpensive drones and conventional cruise missiles. European armed forces should draw three lessons:

• Sensors must be connected more deeply. Fast low-flying targets leave little time for manual handovers between radar, command systems and effectors.
• Defence needs several cost tiers. Guns, interceptor drones and short-range systems must complement high-value surface-to-air missiles.
• Magazine depth matters as much as peak performance. A system that reliably defeats only a few targets is insufficient against long, mixed attack waves.

The war in Ukraine also demonstrates how quickly attack and defence technologies drive each other’s development. Our overview of Ukraine’s military drones examines the other side of that process.

Assessment: more than a faster Shahed

The Geran-5 combines a conventional airframe with components and navigation systems already used across the Geran family. This combination is significant. The jet engine increases speed, while reused electronics and established supply chains may allow Russia to industrialise the design more quickly.

At the same time, it is not a wonder weapon. Its infrared and radar signatures, fuel consumption, more demanding production and dependence on imported components create vulnerabilities for both air defence and sanctions policy. Whether the Geran-5 changes the military balance will not be determined by its specification sheet alone. Actual production numbers, reliability, mission profiles and Ukraine’s ability to scale new interceptors will be decisive.

Frequently asked questions about the Geran-5

What is the Geran-5?

The Geran-5 is a Russian jet-powered one-way attack drone with long range and a permanently installed warhead.

How fast is the Geran-5?

Ukrainian intelligence gives a cruising speed of 450 to 600 km/h. Actual speed varies with altitude, fuel and payload.

What is the range of the Geran-5?

The reported range is up to 950 kilometres with an endurance of up to two hours. This is an intelligence estimate, not an independently measured series-production figure.

How heavy is its warhead?

According to DIU, the Geran-5 carries a 90-kilogram warhead. The precise explosive composition is not publicly established.

Which engine powers the Geran-5?

The examined drone contained a Chinese Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet with a reported thrust of about 1,960 newtons.

Is the Geran-5 a development of the Shahed-136?

It uses components and concepts associated with the Geran family but has a distinctly different conventional airframe. Calling it simply a modified Shahed-136 is misleading.

Can the Geran-5 be launched from a Su-25?

Ukrainian intelligence says Russia is examining that option. Routine operational air launches have not been publicly confirmed.

Why is the Geran-5 harder to intercept?

Its higher speed reduces warning and engagement time and can outrun slower interceptor drones. Suitable radar, gun and missile systems can still engage it.

Sources and further reading

• Defence Intelligence of Ukraine: War & Sanctions – Geran-5 UAV
• Ukrainska Pravda: Technical profile of the Geran-5
• Euronews: Russia expands its use of jet-powered drones
• Konrad Adenauer Foundation: Ukraine Air War Monitor, Vol. XVII
• Militär Aktuell: Source report on new jet-powered attack drones

Editorial status: 20 August 2026. Technical and production data may change as new wreckage analyses and operational observations become available.