China vs Taiwan: How a War Could Unfold

A war between China and Taiwan would not be a regionally limited conflict. It could drag the US and Japan in, block central trade routes and shake the supply of semiconductors worldwide. Nevertheless, a large-scale invasion would not automatically be the first step. More likely is an escalation in several stages: disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressures, controls of shipping, a blockade and only then open combat operations. How far China would go depends on how Taiwan, the US, Japan and other states react. This article therefore does not describe a secure future, but military and politically plausible scenarios.

The Most Important in Short

• A quarantine or naval blockade is considered just as relevant a scenario as an immediate invasion.
• China could combine cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure and military threats.
• An amphibious landing would be militarily and logistically extraordinarily risky for the People’s Liberation Army.
• Military intervention by the US or Japan is possible, but not automatically guaranteed.
• Even a temporary blockade could hit supply chains, semiconductor markets, shipping and insurance worldwide.

How would a war between China and Taiwan likely start?

The frequently drawn picture of thousands of Chinese soldiers landing on Taiwan’s coast without warning falls short. Such an operation would be visible, expensive and difficult to keep secret. China would have to concentrate troops, landing ships, ammunition, fuel, medical capacity and supplies over weeks or months.

At the same time, Beijing could try to create uncertainty. A large-scale exercise could gradually move into a real lockdown. Commercial ships would be controlled, flight routes restricted and military restricted areas declared. Taiwan and its partners would then have to decide at which point they speak of a war.

It is precisely this grey area that makes the scenario dangerous. Those who react militarily too early risk escalation. Those who wait too long could give China time to effectively cut off the island.

China vs. Taiwan: Four realistic escalation scenarios

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. A conflict could start with grey area measures, move into a quarantine and later escalate into a blockade or open invasion. Beijing could also skip individual stages.

The war before the war: grey area operations against Taiwan

Military pressure does not begin with the first missile strike. Taiwan already faces Chinese aircraft, warships, coast guard ships, cyber operations and political influence.

Such activities deliberately remain below the threshold of an openly declared war. They have several objectives:

• Taiwan’s armed forces permanently claim and wear material,
• Explore reaction times and deployment procedures of the Taiwanese Defense,
• unsettling the population,
• weakening confidence in government and armed forces,
• international partners are accustomed to regular Chinese military presence.

In addition, there is disinformation and psychological influence. Fake government communications, manipulated videos or rumors of an alleged capitulation could be spread in a crisis. How such campaigns work explains our contribution about the Methods and Patterns of Modern War Propaganda.

The goal would not only be to disrupt technical systems. China could try to control the perception of the situation. When citizens, soldiers and foreign governments receive conflicting information, any coordinated response becomes more difficult.

Quarantine or blockade: The probably underestimated scenario

What distinguishes a quarantine from a blockade?

In a quarantine, China could claim to only enforce customs, security or import regulations. Certain ships would have to register, cargoes would be checked and individual routes closed. Beijing could present such measures as an internal Chinese affair.

A military blockade continues. Warships, aircraft, submarines and possibly mines would be used to largely eliminate imports and exports. This could include energy, food, spare parts and military supplies.

For Taiwan, a limited closure would already be dangerous. The island is heavily dependent on maritime trade. At the same time, the government would have to decide whether to accompany controlled ships, break through blockade ring areas or first seek diplomatic support.

China trains blockade operations around Taiwan

The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik describes that Chinese maneuvers now explicitly simulate elements of a port blockade. In the exercise “Lianhe Lijian 2024B” up to 135 aircraft and 17 warships were used. In April 2025, Strait Thunder 2025A formed warships, an aircraft carrier group and Chinese Coast Guard ships around Taiwan.

Source: Foundation Science and Politics: Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

On 30 December 2025, the Federal Foreign Office also responded with concern to renewed Chinese military exercises. The exercises would increase tensions and affect stability in the Taiwan Straits.

Source: Federal Foreign Office: China’s military exercises around Taiwan.

Missile and air strikes: How China Could Weaken Taiwan’s Defense

If Beijing uses open force, missile and air strikes could form an early stage of the conflict. Probable target categories would be military airfields, radar positions, air defenses, command facilities, communication systems and naval bases.

The goal would be a so-called system destruction. China would not have to destroy every Taiwanese entity. It could already suffice to temporarily separate leadership, communication, education and supplies.

In parallel, attacks in cyberspace would be conceivable. Power supply, telecommunications, satellite connections, traffic control systems and government networks could be disrupted. Electronic warfare would try to affect radar, radio and navigation.

However, such a first strike would have limits. Taiwan has hardened military facilities, distributed systems and prepared parts of its infrastructure for attack. Mobile air defenses, mobile rocket launchers and decentralized command posts are harder to completely take down than fixed installations.

Even a massive rocket attack therefore does not guarantee rapid control. On the contrary, it could strengthen Taiwan’s political will and make intervention by foreign forces more likely.

More about the interaction of aircraft, air defense and modern air warfare can be found in our overview of Combat aircraft and their military tasks.

Amphibious Invasion: Why a Landing Would Be So Risky

An amphibious invasion would be the most elaborate option. China would have to transport large units across the Taiwan Straits, land on suitable stretches of coast and then permanently supply them with ammunition, fuel, food, spare parts and medical supplies.

The first wave of landing alone would not be enough. Even captured beaches would only have military value if China could quickly make ports or other supply points usable. Destroyed driveways, blocked ports and Taiwanese counterattacks could delay the advance.

Several factors make a landing difficult:

• changeable weather and limited time windows,
• strong currents and difficult sea conditions,
• only limited suitable landing spaces;
• densely populated coastal regions,
• mountains and difficult terrain in the interior of the island,
• the risk of mines, drones, coastal missiles and artillery;
• possible attacks on Chinese transport ships and supply routes.

China has a numerically strong navy and has significantly expanded its capabilities. Numerical superiority on ships or aircraft, however, does not answer the central question: Can the People’s Liberation Army supply large troop units on a contested island for a long time?

The SWP also points to structural problems of the Chinese armed forces. These include highly centralized decisions, a lack of combat experience and the demanding coordination of joint operations of various sub-armed forces.

A Possible China-Taiwan War in Six Stages

1. Political crisis and mobilization: The starting point could be a political decision, an election, an incident at sea or a provocation. China would pull associations together and possibly present the measures as an exercise at first.
2. Information War and Cyber Attacks: Government networks, media, energy supply and communications systems could be attacked. At the same time, contradictory news and messages of intimidation would be spread.
3. Quarantine or blockade: Chinese Coast Guard, Navy and Air Force could control ships, establish exclusion zones and restrict air or sea routes.
4. Missile and air strikes: If Taiwan resists or external actors intervene, China could try to weaken air defenses, airfields, ports and leadership structures.
5. Landing and airborne operations: Only after at least partial control of sea and airspace would larger landings be realistic. Airborne troops could try to occupy individual military or logistical points.
6. Longer War of Wear: Failure of a quick political surrender could lead to fighting in cities and in the inaccessible island interior. The conflict would then become increasingly expensive for China and more difficult to control internationally.

What strategic objectives would China pursue?

A military operation would not have to immediately target the full occupation of Taiwan. Beijing could pursue several intermediate goals:

• forcing Taiwan’s government to make political concessions,
• occupy individual offshore islands,
• control maritime and air transport;
• deter foreign aid,
• convince the population of the hopelessness of further resistance,
• force a change of government or negotiations on Chinese terms.

From a Chinese perspective, a quick success would be particularly valuable. The longer a conflict lasts, the greater the economic damage, international countermeasures and military losses.

This is where Taiwan’s opportunity lies. The island would not have to defeat China on the Chinese mainland. It would have to prevent a quick decision and increase the cost of an attack to such an extent that Beijing’s political goals become unattainable.

How could Taiwan respond to an attack?

Taiwan’s defense is often described as a porcupine strategy. This means a force that is difficult for a superior opponent to attack and even harder to occupy.

This includes mobile and comparatively small systems that can be hidden, laid and used from different directions. In a conflict, the following skills could play a central role:

• mobile coastal and anti-ship missiles;
• air defense and protected radar systems;
• marine mines and unmanned systems;
• drones for reconnaissance and combating military targets,
• hardened command and communication structures;
• reservists and territorial defence,
• decentralised energy, data and supply networks.

Taiwan’s goal would be to slow down Chinese operational planning. Any day without clear Chinese success would increase political pressure on Beijing and give foreign partners more time to make decisions.

Military technology alone is not enough. Resilient government, functioning communications and popular trust would be equally important. If the political leadership breaks down, even modern weapons systems help only to a limited extent.

Would the US defend Taiwan militarily?

A US military deployment is possible, but not legally automatically guaranteed. American Taiwan policy has been working with strategic ambiguity for decades. Beijing should not know how Washington would react in individual cases. At the same time, Taiwan should not assume that every political decision of its own will be automatically secured militarily.

The Federal Centre for Political Education points out that the Taiwan Relations Act does not include a formal duty of military assistance. However, he keeps open the possibility of an American reaction.

Source: Federal Centre for Political Education: Taiwan’s dependence on the USA.

The specific American response would probably depend on several factors:

• Did China openly attack Taiwan or establish a legally difficult quarantine?
• Were American forces or bases hit?
• Does Taiwan explicitly demand military support?
• Do Japan and other partners provide their bases and infrastructure?
• How does the American government assess the risk of nuclear escalation?

The statement that American forces would intervene in any case within a few days would therefore be too clear. Equally dubious would be the claim that Washington will safely leave Taiwan alone.

What role would Japan play?

Japan is geographically close to the conflict zone and hosts important American military bases. These could be used for reconnaissance, logistics, air operations and the protection of maritime routes.

Japan would have to make its own political and legal decisions. Supporting American forces does not automatically mean that Japanese units directly defend Taiwan.

A Chinese attack on American facilities in Japan would fundamentally change the situation. A war over Taiwan could become a major regional conflict. China would therefore have to weigh the military benefits of attacking US bases against the risk of expanding the war.

The Science and Politics Foundation reports that the US and Japan have declared peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits a common core concern and deepened their military cooperation.

Source: Science and Politics Foundation: Japan, China and the Taiwan Question.

Why 2027 Is Not a Fixed Attack Date

In many reports, 2027 appears as a possible date for a Chinese attack. This presentation is misleading. The year stands above all for a military capability goal of the People’s Liberation Army.

By then, Beijing wants to modernize its forces so that they could carry out a Taiwan operation in principle. However, ability is not the same as intention. A military leadership can be prepared for war without the political leadership wanting to start it at this time.

Whether China uses force depends not only on weapons, ships and soldiers. Political developments in Taiwan, US behavior, China’s economic situation, international response and the personal risk-taking of the Chinese leadership also play a role.

The SWP expressly states that a readiness of the People’s Liberation Army for an invasion in 2027 does not mean that an invasion must take place.

Source: Science and Politics Foundation: The Status of Taiwan and the Year 2027.

Global consequences of a war between China and Taiwan

Semiconductors and industrial production

Taiwan has a key position in the semiconductor industry. A conflict would not even have to directly destroy factories to affect production. Power outages, lack of raw materials, interrupted transport, lack of skilled workers or closed ports could suffice.

The Federal Agency for Political Education points to the strong concentration of semiconductor production in East Asia. According to the data analysed there, Taiwan already accounted for around 63 percent of foundry capacities worldwide in 2020.

Source: Federal Centre for Political Education: More Chips for Europe.

Not only smartphones or computers would be affected. Modern cars, machines, medical technology, communication systems, energy systems and weapons systems require semiconductors. German manufacturers could therefore struggle within a short time with missing components and rising prices.

Shipping and Supply Chains

Even before a complete blockade, shipping companies and insurers would react. Ships could be diverted, voyages cancelled or only offered against high risk surcharges.

The German Navy describes the waters of East Asia as part of Germany’s central trade links with China, Japan and South Korea. A military crisis would therefore not only affect Asian states.

Source: Bundeswehr: Trade routes and conflicts in the Far East.

Economic consequences for Germany

Germany would be affected via several channels:

• missing semiconductors and electronic components,
• production failures in the automotive, mechanical and electrical industries,
• increasing transport and insurance costs,
• possible sanctions against China,
• Chinese countermeasures against German companies,
• slumps in exports and investment,
• Uncertainty in financial and commodity markets.

An analysis by the Federal Agency for Political Education in 2026 emphasizes that many precursors for German future industries come from Taiwan, South Korea and China. Alternative sources of supply outside Asia are partially only available to a limited extent.

Source: Federal Centre for Political Education: Germany’s Key Industries and the China Shock.

What would be the risk of nuclear escalation?

The use of nuclear weapons would not be a likely first step. China and the US have a strong interest in keeping a conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold.

Nevertheless, the risk would not be zero. It would increase if attacks hit the Chinese or American mainland, if nuclear and conventional leadership structures could not be clearly separated from each other, or if one side saw its strategic capabilities threatened.

Misinterpretations would be particularly dangerous. An attack on radar, satellite or communication systems could be understood by the other side as preparation for a larger strategic attack.

A prolonged war would therefore not only be economically and conventionally dangerous. It would also increase the number of possible wrong decisions.

What factors would determine the outcome?

Germany and Europe’s position in the Taiwan conflict

Germany does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan as an independent state and adheres to its one-China policy. At the same time, Germany maintains close unofficial, economic and social relations with the democratically governed island.

The German position combines this one-China policy with the demand not to change the status quo unilaterally by force or coercion. At German-Australian ministerial consultations in June 2026, the German Government reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.

Source: Federal Foreign Office: Joint Declaration on peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.

Germany’s response to an open conflict would likely initially focus on diplomacy, sanctions, export controls, humanitarian aid and supply chain protection. A direct military involvement of Germany would be politically and operationally much less likely than a deployment of the US or Japan.

Conclusion: A China-Taiwan war would not have a safe course

A war between China and Taiwan would probably not follow a clean military script. A quarantine, blockade or hybrid pressure campaign could begin long before an invasion. Precisely these intermediate stages would be dangerous, because it would remain unclear when economic and political coercion will transition to open war.

China has significant military capabilities. A conquest of Taiwan would not be an easy operation. The Taiwan Strait, difficult logistics, Taiwan’s defense and a possible American-Japanese response could prevent rapid success.

The outcome would be open. Only the costs would be certain: deaths and injuries, destroyed infrastructure, interrupted trade routes, lack of semiconductors and a global economic crisis. This explains why Germany, its partners and numerous Indo-Pacific countries are committed to deterrence, dialogue and the peaceful preservation of the status quo.

Frequent questions about China and Taiwan

Will China Attack Taiwan in 2027?

This cannot be seriously predicted. The year 2027 is primarily considered a target for the development of Chinese military capabilities. An existing capability does not automatically mean that the political leadership orders an attack.

Which would be more likely: blockade or invasion?

A quarantine or blockade could be less risky for China politically and militarily than an immediate invasion. It could put Taiwan under economic pressure and at the same time test how the US, Japan and other countries react.

Could Taiwan fend off a Chinese attack alone?

Taiwan could inflict heavy losses on China and prevent rapid success. However, against a long-term blockade or a full-scale invasion, the island would rely heavily on foreign support, supplies and political aid.

Would the US automatically enter the war?

No. There is no automatic assistance obligation comparable to NATO. The US is keeping a military response open and supporting Taiwan in its defense capability.

Why is Taiwan so important for the global economy?

Taiwan is a central location for global semiconductor manufacturing. Failures could affect the production of vehicles, machinery, electronics, medical equipment and many other goods.

What consequences would the conflict have for Germany?

Germany would have to expect missing precursors, rising transport costs, production failures and possible sanctions against China. Particularly affected would be the automotive industry, mechanical engineering, electronics and companies with close ties to China.

Sources and additional information

• Federal Foreign Office: China’s military exercises around Taiwan
• Federal Foreign Office: Peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits
• SWP: Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
• SWP: The threat of delegitimization of Taiwan status
• SWP: Dealing with Taiwan
• bpb: More chips for Europe
• bpb: Germany’s key industries and the China shock
• Bundeswehr: Trade routes and conflicts in the Far East