KAAN fighter: technology, engines and Türkiye’s export ambition

KAAN is more than a new combat aircraft. It is intended to give Türkiye greater control over the technologies, supply chains and political decisions that underpin air power. Two completed test flights and a binding Indonesian contract for 48 aircraft show that the programme has moved beyond the mock-up stage. They do not, however, prove that a production-ready stealth fighter is close to operational service.

KAAN at a glance: Turkish Aerospace is developing the twin-engine multirole fighter under the authority of Türkiye’s Presidency of Defence Industries, SSB. Two flights of the first prototype and Indonesia’s export order are confirmed. Claims concerning low observability, sensor fusion, weapons, the indigenous engine and entry into service remain a mixture of programme targets and manufacturer statements.

Editorial status: 15 August 2026. The cover image is an AI-generated editorial concept depiction, not an official manufacturer photograph.

Confirmed programme data

Item	Confirmed public information
Programme authority	Presidency of Defence Industries, SSB
Prime contractor	Turkish Aerospace
Role	Twin-engine, low-observable multirole fighter
Status	Prototype and flight-test phase
First flight	21 February 2024: 13 minutes, 8,000 ft, 230 kt
Second flight	6 May 2024: 14 minutes, 10,000 ft, 230 kt
Turkish schedule	SSB targets initial deliveries in 2028; F-16 replacement is described from the 2030s
First export customer	Indonesia, binding contract for 48 aircraft

Why Türkiye is building KAAN

The Turkish Air Force has relied on the F-16 for decades. Modernisation can extend that fleet’s utility, but it cannot provide a permanent answer to the requirements of contested airspace. Türkiye’s removal from the F-35 programme also demonstrated how foreign policy can determine access to advanced Western equipment.

KAAN therefore has an industrial and strategic purpose. Ankara wants to consolidate design authority, software, sensors, weapons, manufacturing and eventually propulsion within a Turkish-controlled ecosystem. The ambition is not merely to replace an airframe but to retain freedom to upgrade, arm and export it.

Airframe and low-observable design

The prototype follows a familiar low-observable layout: aligned edges, diverterless-looking side intakes, canted twin tails and internal weapon bays. Turkish Aerospace explicitly presents low observability as a central feature. Yet no independently verifiable radar-cross-section data are public.

Stealth performance depends on much more than external shape. Materials, coatings, inlet treatment, apertures, manufacturing tolerances and maintenance discipline all matter. The first prototype proves that the basic configuration can fly. It does not demonstrate the final aircraft’s signature across radar bands or operating conditions.

Sensors, software and combat networking

The manufacturer describes advanced sensors, data fusion, secure communications and artificial-intelligence functions. The operational idea is credible: the pilot should receive a prioritised picture created from radar, infrared, electronic-support and off-board information, rather than manage isolated sensors.

Public evidence remains limited. Radar range, electronic-warfare performance, processor capacity, software maturity and datalink architecture have not been independently verified. Integration with Turkish airborne early-warning aircraft, unmanned combat aircraft and ground sensors will require a long campaign of laboratory, flight and operational testing.

Propulsion is the strategic bottleneck

Early prototypes rely on an available foreign engine foundation. For genuine autonomy, Türkiye ultimately needs a domestically controlled powerplant. A modern fighter engine must combine thrust, efficiency, thermal management, durability and reduced signatures. That is among the most difficult engineering tasks in aerospace.

Turkish authorities describe an indigenous engine as the objective, while public statements surrounding the Indonesian deal also point to a Türkiye-produced solution. This is a target, not proof of a qualified production engine. Until the issue is resolved, schedule, export freedom and performance remain exposed to supplier capacity and export licensing.

Weapons and internal bays

Internal bays are intended to carry air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons without the large signature penalty of external stores. Turkish missiles and precision weapons are logical candidates. However, final loadouts, bay capacity and certified release envelopes are not publicly established.

External stations would offer greater payload and flexibility at the cost of observability. KAAN is therefore likely to use different configurations: a low-signature load for the most heavily defended missions and external weapons when range or mass matters more.

What the flight tests actually prove

Turkish Aerospace says the maiden flight on 21 February 2024 lasted 13 minutes and reached 8,000 feet and 230 knots. On 6 May, the second flight lasted 14 minutes and reached 10,000 feet at the same reported speed. These were deliberately conservative profiles, confirming basic take-off, controls, propulsion and landing.

A complete fighter test campaign demands hundreds of sorties: high angles of attack, supersonic flight, g limits, engine failures, climatic extremes, refuelling, sensor trials, weapons separation, electronic warfare and repeated software regression. Additional prototypes should increase the pace, but the important metric is not a dramatic first flight. It is reliable performance in a stable, production-representative configuration.

Indonesia: export success and programme stress test

In July 2025 Turkish Aerospace, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence and PT Republik Aero Dirgantara signed a binding contract for 48 KAAN aircraft. It is a major strategic success, making Indonesia the first foreign customer and adding an international industrial dimension. Earlier official statements described a 120-month delivery period and local participation.

The order also raises delivery risk. Türkiye must coordinate development, its own air-force requirements, suppliers, training, infrastructure and Indonesian specifications. The decisive questions are which configuration Indonesia will receive, which engine will power it, how technology transfer will work and which dates are contractually firm.

KAAN compared with F-35, KF-21 and Europe’s future systems

Generational labels can mislead. The F-35 is an operational, globally networked system with extensive fleet experience. South Korea’s KF-21 follows an incremental development model and has already flown several prototypes. FCAS and GCAP aim at broader systems of crewed and uncrewed assets but sit further into the future.

KAAN’s prospective strength is sovereign availability and integration of Turkish weapons. Its largest risk is the attempt to mature low observability, propulsion, sensor fusion, software, mass production and exports within an exceptionally compressed period.

Cost, production and unanswered questions

No reliable unit price can yet be derived from public information. Development, flyaway aircraft, engines, spares, weapons, training and infrastructure must be separated. Early production lots are normally more expensive and less complete. Planned fleet numbers should be treated as political objectives until supported by transparent multi-year procurement.

• When will the next prototypes fly in a production-representative configuration?
• Which engine will equip Turkish and Indonesian series aircraft?
• When will supersonic, weapons and signature testing begin?
• Which sensors and datalinks will be operational at first delivery?
• What production rate and through-life cost can industry sustain?

Assessment

KAAN is already a serious industrial programme: a full-size prototype has flown twice and an export contract exists. But the hardest part is only beginning. More prototypes, a credible engine solution, demonstrated mission systems and repeatable production will determine whether a symbol of Turkish autonomy becomes an enduring combat capability.

Frequently asked questions

Is KAAN operational?

No. It remains in prototype development and flight testing.

Is KAAN a true stealth fighter?

Its design pursues reduced observability, but no public measurements allow a responsible assessment of its actual signature.

When could Türkiye receive KAAN?

SSB lists 2028 as a target, while Turkish Aerospace describes F-16 replacement from the 2030s. These are planning objectives.

Has Indonesia really ordered KAAN?

Yes. Turkish Aerospace announced a binding contract for 48 aircraft in July 2025.

Official sources

• Turkish Aerospace: KAAN product and flight-test data
• SSB: National Fighter Aircraft KAAN Development Project
• Turkish Aerospace: contract for 48 KAAN aircraft for Indonesia
• Turkish Aerospace: export programme and delivery framework